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This study makes use of an unusual opportunity to manipulate framing of a simple decision 
under uncertainty: whether or not to answer an exam question when unsure which answer is 
correct and a missing response is scored higher than an incorrect one. Two treatments were 
compared in a natural field experiment: one in which the decision was framed in terms of 
losses, and the other – in terms of gains. Some alternative theories of decision making under 
risk, notably prospect theory, propose that individuals display reflection effect, i.e. tend to be 
more risk-seeking in losses than gains. No such evidence was found: subjects were generally 












C93, D81 1 Introduction
The leading alternative theory of decision making under risk—the cumulative
prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992), proposes that most individ-
uals are generally reluctant to accept sure losses. They may be willing to
assume additional risk if it creates a chance to break even. In other words, in-
dividuals are risk-averse in gains and risk-seeking in losses, at least for events
of moderate probability (reﬂection eﬀect). One well known example of this
phenomenon is the disposition eﬀect (Odean 1998) – the tendency to hold on
to losing stocks, in the hope that the price goes back up again (while winners
would often be sold quickly). Another interesting case is the withholding
phenomenon – the tendency of taxpayers to show more compliance when
they are owed a refund than when they owe additional tax (Clotfelter 1983).
However, these and most of other empirical cases supporting the reﬂection
eﬀect are fairly complex phenomena and alternative explanations are often
possible.
Perhaps the most substantial bulk of evidence in favor of the reﬂection ef-
fect comes from laboratory experiments on framing. In this approach, largely
inspired by the “Asian disease” problem of lives lost vs. lives saved by Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1981), a hypothetical gamble is either presented in terms
of losses or gains. A meta-analysis of this literature (Kuhberger 1998) con-
ﬁrms a moderate eﬀect of greater risk seeking in losses. Experiments with
real incentives are much less common (but see e.g. Kuhberger, Schulte-
Mecklenbeck, and Perner (2002)), chieﬂy because inducing a feeling of loss
in the lab is not trivial.
To date, there have been very few ﬁeld experiments aimed at identify-
ing and possibly measuring risk-seeking in losses. The main methodological
problem is that it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd situations in which a sizable population is
involved in simple case of decision making under risk with non-trivial stakes
and potential losses that can be actively manipulated by the researcher, ob-
served and registered without the participants’ knowledge and consent. In
this study I make use of a unique opportunity to induce perception of a pos-
sible loss in a simple situation of decision making under uncertainty. The
ﬁndings can be summarized succinctly: subjects are just as risk-averse in
losses as they are in gains and it seems to be diﬃcult to ascribe this null re-
sult to any of the “usual suspects” – sample size, stakes, confusion, boredom,
ceiling eﬀect, etc. In view of the predominantly positive ﬁndings in previous
studies, it is an intriguing result that calls for future research. It may suggest
that the reﬂection eﬀect is not as robust as it is sometimes believed to be.
12 Design
The study was performed during an examination at the University of War-
saw - the ﬁnal exam in Microeconomics at the Faculty of Economic Sciences.
The exam involved 30 multiple-choice questions (with one correct and three
to four incorrect answers each). Unbeknownst to the students, exam in-
structions came in two types, as far as the number of points per item was
concerned: the Loss Treatment (LT) and the Gain Treatment (GT), see Table
1.
Table 1: Numbers of points awarded per answer
treatment correct missing incorrect
LT 0 -2 -3
GT 3 1 0
Note that one could never lose a point in GT nor gain a point in LT.
Whatever answer was given to any question, a student would be awarded
three points more in the GT than in the LT.1 As a result, any combination
of answers would automatically bring 90 points more in the gain than in the
loss condition. Accordingly, students in the loss condition would start with
the score of 90 points.
With regards to the information provided to the students, before the exam
they had only been told that leaving a question unanswered would yield more
points than giving an incorrect answer. Assignment to exam rooms and, as
a consequence, to the two treatments was random. At the start of the exam,
the students were given the accurate description of the scoring rules relevant
for their treatment only (the translation of the exam copies are available from
the author). They were also told that most likely approx. 45 points would
be necessary to pass.
After the exam, the students were asked to predict their score. They were
told that one of those who get it right (or else are closest) would obtain a
monetary reward of 250 PLN (approx. 62 euro).
One hundred and ﬁfty three students took part in the exam and the ex-
periment, and submitted their predictions (one student skipped all the exam
questions as well as the prediction and was removed from the database). The
data collected involved the gender of the student, his or her grade obtained in
1Bosch-Dom` enech and Silvestre (2006) call it “translation”
2the tutorials, name of the teaching assistant, the number of correct, incorrect,
and missing answers and ﬁnally the predicted score.
3 Predictions
Choosing the best answer is obviously a task involving a subject-speciﬁc skill
and knowledge. However, whether to actually choose it or rather leave the
question unanswered is a decision under uncertainty.
Crucially, for any level of certainty about one’s ability to pick the right
answer, answering the question is a risky option, while giving no answer guar-
antees a ﬁxed payoﬀ. Prospect theory proposes that for a moderate proba-
bility of the highest of two outcomes, most individuals will be risk-averse in
the domain of gains but risk-seeking in the domain of losses. This pattern
results from the curvature of the value function, being concave for gains and
convex for losses and the shape of the probability weighting function.
More precisely, let us denote the minimum individually perceived proba-
bility of selecting the right answer that would induce an individual to take
the risk under GT as p. With standard prospect-theoretic notation we have
w+(p)v(3) = v(1). Suppose for a moment that probability weighting is lin-
ear, then we have that pv(3) = v(1) so if v is concave for gains, it implies
that p > 1/3. We now ask what this person would do under LT. Generally,
she will take the risk if w−(1 − p)v(−3) > v(−2) which under linear proba-
bility weighting simpliﬁes to (1 − p)v(−3) > v(−2). If v is convex for losses
and 1 − p < 2/3, this will indeed be satisﬁed. Thus convex/concave value
function with correct probability weighting implies that the minimum level
of certainty required to answer the question is lower for LT than GT. Conse-
quently, more risk will be taken (less questions skipped) under LT. However,
studies on Cumulative Prospect Theory further claim that a typical subject
overweights low probabilities (say, below .3) and underweights moderate and
high probabilities. If p is moderate for most subjects, perhaps between .3
and .7, as we will later show, then both “extreme” events (obtaining 3 or -3)
are underweighted, which further strengthens the risk-loving tendency under
LT than GT.
There are two important caveats to this prediction. First, obviously, it is
not clear whether endowing subjects with 90 points up-front and then slowly
taking them away truly induces a feeling of a loss. However, the “windfall”
nature of such endowment appears, if anything, to induce even more risk-
seeking (“house money eﬀect”, Thaler and Johnson (1990)).
Second, participants’ behavior may be entirely driven by willingness to
obtain a possibly highest grade, rather than maximizing the number of points.
3For example, if a student contemplating whether or not to try to answer any
given question knows that of the remaining 29 problems he has selected the
correct answer to 15 questions and given no answer to 14 questions (obtaining
59 points under GT) and furthermore that the next grade threshold is 60, it
seems an obvious choice to skip the remaining question. This is true under
both treatments. However, this reasoning rests on strong assumptions.
First, that participants are indiﬀerent to various point scores as long as
they obtain the same grade. Still, students in the elite academic program
under scrutiny are typically highly motivated; scoring 34 points out of 90
is less unpleasant and humiliating than ending up with just 15, although
both would result in the same grade. In this sense, the grade is not all that
matters. Furthermore, losing by a small margin only, students may generally
expect more leniency on the part of the lecturer (e.g. his or her willingness
to grant an additional chance to pass).
The second implicit assumption is that students are able to perfectly
predict their score and thus tell when they are, say, just below the threshold.
As we will see when analyzing the prediction data, this was not the case.
More generally, this kind of concern applies equally to monetary rewards:
the value of money is in the goods and services that it can buy. It seems
that in our case points could play the role of a “prime reinforcer,” just as we
generally believe money does in standard lab experiments.
As for other eﬀects that we may expect, a great many studies show that
males are generally more willing to take risk than females (Byrnes, Miller,
and Schafer 1999), especially when it is based on assessment of own ability.
We therefore predict less unanswered questions in male subjects.
To provide an additional measure of risk aversion, one of the questions was
designed to be extremely diﬃcult (and explicitly labeled as such), involving
a tricky integral that students were very unlikely to be able to solve under
strict time constraints. Three of the four answers were numerically very
close to one another (and hence equally likely to be correct, unless one was
able to actually solve the problem), while the fourth one was absurdly high
(equal to 100100). Thus from the perspective of a subject in GT, answering
this question was tantamount to taking a lottery (3,1/3), while skipping it
resulted in a payoﬀ of 1 for sure, i.e. (1,1). Similarly, those in the LT had a
choice between (−3,2/3) and (−2,1). Risk-seeking individuals should thus
answer the question, while risk-averters should skip it.
44 Results
Overall, students left 7.58 questions unanswered. This number varied sub-
stantially between subjects, the standard deviation was 4.47. Only two stu-
dents tried to answer all the questions.
The treatment eﬀect turns out to be small and insigniﬁcant. Indeed
the mean number of missing answers among the 79 subjects in the Gain
Treatment was 7.76, while the mean of 74 observations in the LT was 7.09.
The diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (p = 0.31 in a simple two-sided t-test, p =
0.45 in a nonparametric Mann-Whitney test).
Regarding the malicious unsolvable integral, only eight out of 153 subjects
(ﬁve in LT, three in GT) tried to guess the answer. None of them chose the
ostensibly high 100100, but only three actually picked the right answer, in
line with our assumption that the questions represented a (3,1/3) gamble.
Therefore we conclude that subjects were generally risk-averse.2 Figure 1
suggests that these 8 subjects did not seem to be systematically diﬀerent from
others in terms of their predictions or actual scores. There is thus no evidence
of risk posture being aﬀected by own position with respect to thresholds. As
a matter of fact, this general unwillingness to take a fair bet even among
individuals who (correctly) expect to be below the passing threshold and
should thus like to increase the variance of their score is remarkable. It
may perhaps be best explained in terms of ambiguity aversion, especially
if students imagine they could subsequently be asked to justify their choice
(Trautmann, Vieider, and Wakker 2008).
Regarding subjects’ predictions, Figure 1 shows that they had a general
idea about their score but they were not able to predict it very precisely and
were somewhat overly conﬁdent or optimistic (there are more observations
above the 45 ◦ line than below). It also reveals that treatment had no impact
on prediction optimism or accuracy.
It may also be instructive to investigate the individually perceived success
rates for the questions the subjects did answer that are implied by their
predictions. For example, if a student answered 20 questions (thus skipped
ten) and then predicted a score of 43, it means, she expected to get 33
points for the questions she did answer (thus have 11 correct answers), so
her implied success rate will be 11/20. Figure 2 shows the distributions of
predictions-implied success rates for the two treatments.
Again, not surprisingly, we do not see any treatment eﬀect here either.
Secondly, note that there are very few (approx. 5%) values outside of the
2This also validates our claim that the minimum probability of success necessary to
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Figure 2: Predicted success rate, by treatment
7admissible [0,1] interval. This suggests that large majority of subjects un-
derstood the scoring rules and put at least minimal eﬀort in predicting their
outcome. Thirdly, the picture provides us with an additional hint regarding
subjects’ minimum probability of success necessary to take the risk. Con-
sider a student with implied success rate of .8. Presumably, she is quite sure
about some of her answers. Her perceived conﬁdence in the answer she is
least certain about must be substantially below .8. This conﬁrms our claim
that the threshold probability is below .7 in most subjects.
It is interesting to consider the relationship between the predicted score
and the number of missing answers. It is represented in Figure 3 which
also shows a lowess approximation. The observed overall inversed U-shaped
relationship is not surprising – with a large number of missing answers both
very low and very high scores are excluded or extremely unlikely. It is more
instructive to take a closer look at the number of missing answers for students
with intermediate predictions. If our concern that students only cared about
the grade (especially passing vs. failing) and thought they could predict their
score precisely was valid, we would observe very little risk taking (a sudden
hike in the number of missing answers) just above the announced threshold
of 45 points. No such pattern can be seen.
Concerning our auxiliary hypothesis of males being more self-assure and/or
more risk-seeking, gender eﬀect was indeed signiﬁcant – on average females
left 8.04 questions unanswered while males only 6.86 (p = .05 in a MMW
test). This was not associated with any superior knowledge – scores obtained
(for either part of the exam) were nearly identical across genders.
By means of a multiple regression we may look for an interaction between
gender and treatment. Table 2, where we also control for the grade obtained
at tutorials, shows that there was no such eﬀect.
Table 2: Factors aﬀecting the number of missing answers
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Figure 3: Predicted score and missing answers, by treatment
95 Conclusion
The current study was planned as a straightforward ﬁeld test of the reﬂection
eﬀect. Despite a fairly large sample of subjects motivated to make best
choices possible, such a pattern was hardly detected. This null eﬀect cannot
be ascribed to the speciﬁcity of the sample, in the sense that laboratory
experiments on risk posture use university students as well. Nor was it
likely that subjects did not notice or understand the scoring rules. Apparent
deviation from the pattern predicted by Kahneman and Tversky could result
from the fact that the underlying reward medium involved academic success
rather than money; but to the extent that biases such as the reﬂection eﬀect
go away with experience, the all–too-familiar monetary domain is the one
where we would least expect it to show. The study therefore casts some
doubts on the empirical validity of the hypothesis of risk-seeking in losses
(and thus the reﬂection eﬀect).
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